We propose a new framework for representing logics, called LF + and based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework. The new framework allows us to give, apparently for the rst time, general de nitions which capture how well a logic has been represented. These de nitions are possible since we are able to distinguish in a generic way that part of the LF + entailment which corresponds to the underlying logic. This distinction does not seem to be possible with other frameworks. Using our de nitions, we show that, for example, natural deduction rst-order logic can be well-represented in LF + , whereas linear and relevant logics cannot. We also show that our syntactic de nitions of representation have a simple formulation as indexed isomorphisms, which both con rms that our approach is a natural one and provides a link between type-theoretic and categorical approaches to frameworks.
Introduction
Much e ort has been devoted to building systems for supporting the construction of formal proofs in various logics: examples of such systems include HOL Gor87], LEGO LP92], Alf ACN90] and NuPrl Con86]. Existing implementations for particular logics cannot easily be adapted to other logics. It is therefore desirable to seek a framework for representing logics, which uni es the structure common to a wide variety of logics. The aim of such a framework is to provide insights into the important theoretical question of what a logic is, and to yield general rather than logic-speci c implementations of these logics.
Type theories have emerged as leading candidates for frameworks: examples include the Edinburgh Logical Framework HHP87] and Isabelle Pau87]. When using type theories in this way, the method of representation is necessarily informal, due to the variations in the styles of presentations of the logics under consideration; in fact, some logics cannot be well-represented because the meta-theory of the logic is incompatible with the meta-theory of the type theory. It is therefore necessary to provide criteria which determine when a representation is correct. We propose a new framework, called LF + and based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework. The new framework allows us to give, apparently for the rst time, general de nitions which capture how well a logic has been represented. These de nitions are possible since we are able to distinguish, in a generic way, that part of the LF + entailment relation which corresponds to the underlying logic. This distinction does not seem to be possible using other frameworks; in section 2 we discuss this point for LF. Using our de nitions, we show that, for example, natural deduction rst-order logic can be well-represented in LF + , whereas linear and relevant logics cannot. These syntactic de nitions of representation have a simple formulation as indexed isomorphisms, which both con rms that our approach is a natural one, and provides a link between type-theoretic and categorical approaches to frameworks.
There are many possible de nitions of`correct' representation, which depend on the amount of structure we wish to preserve. In this paper, we concentrate on two de nitions of representation: adequate representation, which de nes when the consequence relation of a logic has been well-represented by the LF + entailment relation, and natural representation, which requires in addition that derivations have been well-represented. Our adequacy de nition bears some relation to the notion of uniform encoding in LF de ned in HST89], which essentially involves tagging the LF signatures to indicate the types of interest. Using LF + , we immediately know the part of the entailment relation we require, and so this`extra-logical' tagging is not necessary. More reecently, Simpson has studied the semantic analysis of a related notion of adequacy Sim92] for the type theory underlying Isabelle Pau87] and -Prolog MN86].
Summary We introduce the new framework LF + in section 2, and give examples to illustrate representation in this framework. Section 3 contains the formal justi cation for LF + . We give an axiomatic account of a logic, which has just enough structure to present logics as indexed categories. Using this account, we de ne the notions of adequate and natural representation. We also give examples to illustrate these de nitions and prove that certain logics cannot be well-represented in LF + . In section 4, we show that our syntactic de nitions of representation give rise to indexed isomorphisms.
The Logical Framework LF +
The framework LF + is based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) of Harper, Honsell and Plotkin HHP87]. In uenced by various AUTOMATH languages Bru80] and by Martin-L of's work on the foundations of intuitionistic logic Mar85], LF constitutes an important advance in the study of logical frameworks. It is not possible, however, to provide general de nitions of correct' representation using LF. These de nitions are possible using LF + .
A logic is speci ed in LF by a signature declaring a nite set of constants that gives the syntax, judgements and inference rules of the logic; LF together with this signature forms the representing type theory. Each signature is accompanied by an adequacy theorem, which provides some con rmation that the consequence relation and proof structure have been wellrepresented. However, these adequacy theorems only apply to particular logics. They cannot be stated more generally for a wide class of logics. This is because information is lost during representation owing to the fact that a LF signature does not provide enough information to reconstruct the underlying logic. For example, a LF signature does not distinguish those types corresponding to the syntactic classes and those corresponding to judgements. It also does not distinguish the extra types which have no correspondence in the underlying logic, and which are often required as part of the machinery of the representation. It is therefore not possible to identify the part of the LF entailment relation which corresponds to the consequence relation of the underlying logic without appealing to that particular logic. In LF + , we take advantage of the distinctions between types given by the universes of Pure Type Systems Bar92] to provide a framework where such an identi cation is possible.
The type theory of LF + is a variant of the LF type theory which allows for extra distinctions between types. It has three universes, called Sort, Extra and Judge, in place of the single LF universe Type. The intention is for the terms of the logic to be represented using Sort, the judgements to be represented using Judge, and the universe Extra to contain the extra types which have no immediate correspondence with the underlying logic. Using these distinctions, we are indeed able to identify that part of the representing type theory which corresponds to the underlying logic without reference to speci c signatures, and so provide the general de nitions of correct representation we seek.
In this section, we present the type theory of LF + using an extension of the Pure Type System presentation to allow for -equality and signatures. The meta-theoretic results necessary to make this extension rigorous can be found in Geu92]. We give examples of representations in LF + to show the techniques required. These examples are also used to illustrate our de nitions of adequate and natural representation given in section 3.
Pure Type Systems with -equality and signatures
The distinction between terms required by LF + exploits, and was partially inspired by, the techniques of Beradi Ber90] and Terlouw Ter89] in extending Barendregt's -cube to Pure Type Systems (PTSs) Bar92]. The framework LF + is presented as a PTS with -equality, adapted to distinguish between signatures and contexts. This adaptation is necessary to give a precise representation of LF + , since the formation of signatures and contexts is di erent. This di erence is not surprising as signatures are used to specify logics, whereas one of the uses of contexts is to represent assumptions. In HHP87], LF is presented as a type theory withequality. The stronger -equality allows for a smoother correspondence between the logic and its representing type theory, since every well-typed term is convertible to a unique canonical element, and also simpli es considerably the uni cation problem for LF Pym92] and hence for LF + . 1 2.1 Definition A speci cation of a PTS with signatures is a quadruple (U; V; A; R) where U is a set, called the set of universes; V U is the set of variable universes; A U U is the set of axioms; R V U U is the set of rules.
The set of preterms T of a PTS with signatures given by the speci cation (U; V; A; R)
is de ned using countably in nite sets of variables Var The idea of splitting the universe Type of LF into three motivates the choice of U; V and A. Some justi cation of the set of rules R is required. An important point to note is that the -abstraction of sorts, extra types and judgements all inhabit Extra. This is because we view -abstraction as part of the machinery of the meta-theory, rather than as having a direct correspondence in the object logic, since the aim is to capture a wide variety of logics. In contrast, various predicative intuitionistic logics can be presented as type theories using the propositions-as-types paradigm CF58, Bru80, How80], by equating -abstraction with universal quanti cation.
Alternatives to this choice of rules are discussed in Gar92]. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that the syntax of a logic does not depend on the derivations of the logic; for this reason we have omitted the rules (Judge; Sort; Extra) and (Judge; Extra; Extra). A natural example of a logic where formulae depend on proofs is a rst-order logic with a choice operator:
that is, given a proof p of 9x: (x) we obtain a term t dependent on p such that (t) is true.
Such a logic would include a syntactic class of proofs, and judgements linking proofs with formulae. Our assumption does not therefore restrict such a logic. Also, notice that we include (Sort; Kind; Kind) and (Extra; Kind; Kind), but not (Judge; Kind; Kind). As the examples below illustrate, the rst two rules are used to form judgements. We do not include the rule (Judge; Kind; Kind), since it would correspond in the logic to syntactic classes or judgements depending on derivations.
Representation in LF +
We sketch three examples of representations in LF + : natural-deduction rst-order logic Pra65] has a direct representation, higher-order logic Chu40] has a representation which requires extra constants to represent the syntax of the logic, and Hilbert-style S 4 Che80] has a representation which requires extra constants to represent the consequence relation. These examples are also used to illustrate our de nitions of adequate and natural representation in the next section. Further examples can be found in Gar92], or adapted from the examples in AHMP92]. 2.9 Example We consider a fragment of natural-deduction rst-order logic with arithmetic, whose terms and formulae are given by abstract grammar terms t ::= x j 0 j succ(t) j + (t)(t 0 ) formulae ::= (t=t 0 ) j j 8x: ; whose inhabitants correspond to the well-formed arithmetic terms and formulae respectively. In general, inhabitants of Sort should correspond to syntactic classes containing variables. Syntactic classes which do not contain variables should be represented by inhabitants of Extra. This distinction between the syntactic classes is required to give a precise link between the consequence relation of the logic and the corresponding LF + entailment relation. For example, the consequence relation of natural-deduction rst-order logic does not contain formulae variables. This use of the universe Extra is, however, comparatively minor; more interesting uses are illustrated by the higher-order logic and Hilbert-style S 4 examples given below. We also declare the constant true : o ! Judge;
where LF + terms of the form true( ) for : o correspond to the judgement that formulae are true in rst-order logic. In the corresponding LF representation of rst-order logic, it is not possible to distinguish those LF terms corresponding to judgements and those corresponding to syntactic classes without appealing to the particular LF constants used, since all these terms inhabit the universe Type.
The rest of the speci cation follows the techniques used to represent rst-order logic in LF and is given below; for a detailed account of the techniques involved, see HHP87] or Gar92]. The terms and formulae are represented using the constants 0 : succ : For each : dom, it is the term obj ( ) which represents a domain of higher-order logic, rather than itself, since inhabitants of obj ( ) correspond to the terms of the logic. Thus obj ( ) is a sort, and term : dom is considered an extra term as the universes suggest. The inhabitants of obj ( ) are constructed in a similar fashion to the inhabitants of and o given in the previous example. The full LF + speci cation of higher-order logic can be found in Gar92].
The above example demonstrates the technique of using the Extra universe to represent extra constants. Notice that, in the representations of rst-order and higher-order logic in LF + , the term corresponding to the syntactic class of formulae is the extra term o in the rst representation, and sort obj (o) in the second. The former distinguishes between the rst-order terms and formulae, whereas the latter treats a formula as any other term expression. This mirrors precisely the behaviour of formulae in rst-order and higher-order logic. where X denotes a formula variable, and we consider the rules: 3 Adequate and Natural Representation
In this section, we provide a formal justi cation for de ning the new framework LF + . The examples in section 2.3 illustrate how to identify in a general way that part of the LF + entailment relation which corresponds to the underlying logic. This identi cation can be used to provide general de nitions of correct representation. The de nitions vary depending on how much structure of the logic one wishes to capture. We focus on the notion of an adequate representation, which states when the consequence relation of the logic has been well-represented, and natural representation, which gives some measure that the proof structure has been preserved during representation. An immediate result is that if the consequence relation has been wellrepresented, then the meta-theory of the consequence relation and the LF + entailment relation must be compatible: an obvious requirement, which could not be proved using LF. 
Logical preliminaries
In order to analyse representations of logics in LF + , we require some standard terminology for the logics under consideration. This terminology is kept at an abstract level so that our de nitions of representation apply to a wide variety of logics presented with di erent syntactic styles. For the purposes of this paper, logics consist of syntax, judgements and a consequence relation. The syntax is based on a possibly in nite set of syntactic classes, with the subset S of syntactic classes containing variables distinguished. Notice that property 1 follows from properties 2 and 3. Let tfs 1 =x 1 ; : : : s n =x n g (sometimes denoted by tfs=xg) for t 2 T denote the term expression sub (t), where (x i ) = s i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and (y) = y for y 6 2 fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g. Similarly, we let jfs 1 =x 1 ; : : : s n =x n g, or jfs=xg, denote the judgement Sub (j).
We also de ne the free variable functions Notice that property 6 follows from property 9. We focus on an abstract de nition of consequence relation of a logic, with the intention that it is formed using the proof system of the logic. Unlike the usual de nition of consequence relation (see for example Avr91]), our de nition depends on the free variables of the judgements under consideration. This re nement of the consequence relation is necessary, since we aim to link the consequence relation of a logic with its corresponding LF + entailment relation, and variables must be declared explicitly in type theory.
3.1 Definition The consequence relation of a logic is a ternary relation written in the form ?`fx g j, where j is a judgement, ? is a multiset of judgements and fxg is a set of distinct variables of the logic with Fv `fx g k.
A consequence relation satisfying weakening is a consequence relation which also satis es 5. (weakening) ?`fx g j and Fv(k) fxg imply ? fkg`fx g j.
A consequence relation satisfying contraction is a consequence relation which also satis es 6. (contraction) ?; j; j`fx g k implies ?; j`fx g k.
This abstract notion of a logic gives us enough structure to present logics as strict indexed categories (de nition 4.4).
3.2 Type theoretic preliminaries: the -long normal forms
Our analysis of representations of logics in LF + is given up to -equivalence. In particular, we concentrate on LF + terms in -long normal form with respect to the appropriate signature and context, which are canonical elements for the equivalence classes under -equality. The intuition is that the terms in -long normal form with respect to some signature and context are fully applied. For example, in the LF + representation of rst-order logic speci ed by Fol (example 2.9), we associate the formula 8x:(y = x) with the LF + term 8( The key property of -long normal forms is that they provide canonical terms for the equivalence classes under -equality. The proof of this property is non-trivial, and can be adapted from results in DHW93] and Gar93a]. 
Adequate Representations
We now give the de nition of adequate representation, which characterises when the consequence relation of a logic has been well-represented in LF + . Our de nition provides a precise correspondence between the consequence relation of the logic, and that part of the LF + entailment relation given by the sorts and judgements. This correspondence identi es variables of the represented logic with sort variables, preserves substitution, and gives a sound and complete interpretation of the consequence relation in the entailment relation. The de nition is given in two parts. First, we de ne an encoding which gives the correspondence from the logic to the type theory. We then de ne an adequate encoding, which gives the correspondence the other way. These de nitions are given using LF + terms in -long normal form.
First some notation is required. Recall that, for an arbitrary logic, we distinguish the set S of syntactic classes containing variables. The variables are partitioned by the syntactic classes in S. For example, in higher-order logic we have variables x and y o in the syntactic classes and o respectively. The sort variables of LF + , however, are not partitioned; the sorts they inhabit are determined by the contexts in which they are declared. For example, in the representation of higher-order logic in LF + given in example 2.10, we have the freedom to declare the contexts x : obj ( ) and x : obj (o) for sort variable x 2 Var Sort . We obtain a precise link between variables of the logic and sort variables by introducing a countably in nite set of variables of the logic, denoted by Var Log , which is not partitioned by the syntactic classes. We then write x c to declare that x 2 Var Log inhabits syntactic class c, and let T(x) and J(x) denote the sets of term expressions and judgements with free variables in fxg, wherex We shall sometimes omit the superscripts on ] ] S , ] ] T x and ] ] J x , when the domain is apparent. Notice that the encoding de nition depends on certain properties of the logics under consideration. We assume the syntactic classes do not depend on variables. We also assume that the term expressions and the judgements do not contain information regarding derivations. In the above de nition the soundness condition is only concerned with inhabitation of LF + terms, since the standard consequence relation of the logic contains no information regarding the structure of derivations. In our de nition of natural representation (de nition 3.12), the inhabitants of LF + judgements correspond to derivations.
An adequate encoding provides an exact correspondence between the consequence relation of a logic and part of the entailment relation of the relating type theory. In order to provide the correspondence from the representing type theory to the underlying logic, we identify the following sets of LF + terms: The representations of rst-order logic, higher-order logic and Hilbert-style S 4 sketched in section 3.1 are all adequate. Ideally, the correspondence between a logic and its representation in a framework should be immediately apparent, although it is not clear that this goal is compatible with the aim of representing a wide variety of logics. With LF + , the correspondence between a well-represented logic and the representing type theory is usually obvious, although some work must be done to show that the conditions stipulated in de nitions 3.6 and 3.7 are satis ed. It is intuitively clear that, for a logic to be well-represented in a framework, the meta-theory of the logic and the framework must be compatible. We are at last able to capture this intuition, as the following theorem states. 
Natural Representations
Our de nition of natural representation extends the notion of adequate representation to require, in addition, a correspondence between derivations in the logic and LF + terms inhabiting judgements. This extension gives some indication that the proof system of a logic can be mimicked by its representation in LF + , and provides a full generalisation to arbitrary logics of the adequacy theorems accompanying the LF representations in HHP87] for particular logics.
Following HHP87], our de nition of natural representation focuses on the notion of a consequence relation of proofs. This notion is de ned by extending the syntax of the logic to incorporate a set of proof expressions, which includes an in nite set of proof variables. The de nitions of simultaneous substitution and free variables for proof expressions can be given in a similar fashion to the de nitions in section 3.1 for term expressions and judgements. The consequence relation of proofs identi es the valid proof expressions, with the intuition that valid proof expressions correspond to derivations in the logic. In order to de ne natural representations, it is enough for us to give an abstract characterisation of the consequence relation of proofs. Our intention is for the consequence relation of proofs to be constructed by adapting the proof system of the logic to identify those proof expressions that are valid. For example, associated with the E-rule of rst-order logic are proof expressions of the form E( )( )(p)(q), such that E( )( )(p)(q) is valid whenever p denotes a valid proof expression for , and q denotes a valid proof expression for .
A consequence relation of proofs is a ternary relation written in the form ?`fx g : j, where
? is a set of proof assumptions of the form fp 1 :j 1 ; : : : ; p m :j m g for m 0 such that the p i are distinct proof variables, the j 1 ; : : : ; j m and j are judgements whose free variables are contained in the distinct set of variables fxg, and is a proof expression with free variables in fxg and free proof variables in fp 1 ; : : : ; p m g. We say that such a proof expression is valid for judgement j under ?. The consequence relation of proofs must satisfy: Just as in the de nition of adequate encoding, we rst de ne the notion of strong encoding, which extends the de nition of encoding (de nition 3.6), and then de ne when a strong encoding is natural. First, we x some notation. Let Var Proof denote the countably in nite set of proof variables of the logic, and let P(x; ?) denote the set of proof expressions with free variables in the sequence of variablesx, and free proof variables in the sequence of proof assumptions ?. Again, we sometimes omit the superscript on ] ] P x; when the domain is apparent. Before we give the de nition of natural representation, we require some notation. The de nition uses the set of LF + terms proof ? = fp such that ?` p : J : Judge and p is in -long normal form wrt. ( ; ?)g:
For sequences of variablesx and proof assumptions , let V P(x; ) denote the subset of P(x; ) consisting of valid proof expressions. In (LF + , Log ), the valid proof expressions correspond to inhabitants of judgements; the proof expressions as a whole are not represented. We therefore restrict ] ] P x; to the valid proof expressions, and de ne the function ] ] P x; : V P(x; ) ! proof ?x;? as the function extensionally equal to ] ] P x; , but restricted to the domain V P(x; ) and given with the more precise range. We say that the logic is naturally represented in LF + if there is a natural encoding of Log in (LF + , Log ). The adequate representations of rst-order logic and higher-order logic sketched in section 2.3 are also natural. To prove this, one must de ne a language of proof expressions for the logics and provide proof systems for deriving valid proof expressions, with the property that the valid proof expressions correspond to derivations in the logics. We state the theorem; the details can be found in Gar92].
3.13 Theorem The signatures Fol and Hol sketched in section 2.3 provide natural representations of rst-order logic and higher-order logic respectively in LF + .
3.14 Example In Gar92], we show that the LF + representation of Hilbert-style S 4 discussed in example 2.11 is adequate, but not natural. The intuition behind this (without resorting to the technical detail of proof expressions) is that the number of constants in Mod which specify the proof system of Hilbert-style S 4 is more than the number of rules in the proof system. By the compositional property of de nition 3.11, this means that the functions from valid proof expressions to inhabitants in -long normal form of judgements cannot be bijections.
Just as in the case of adequate representations, the meta-theory associated with proofs in a logic represented naturally in LF + must be compatible with the meta-theory for the framework. where seq i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and seq have the form j 1 ; : : : ; j n )x j for judgements j 1 ; : : : ; j n ; j, which may contain schematic variables. Similar consequence relations have also been studied by Aczel Acz92] . The advantage of this approach is that it captures the notion of the existence of a derivation without adapting the logic to incorporate proof expressions. The characterisation of this consequence relation in LF + is left for future research.
Adequate and natural representations give rise to indexed isomorphisms
We have argued that the syntactic de nition of adequate representation de nes when the consequence relation of a logic has been well-represented in the representing type theory. Our arguments are reinforced in this section by showing that our syntactic de nition has a direct categorical formulation as an indexed isomorphism. It is known that the mathematical structure common to the logics under consideration can be captured by the structure of strict indexed categories PS78] (or split brations Ben85]), whose base categories are given by term expressions and whose bres are given by consequence relations. By utilising the fact that we are able to identify in a general way that part of the LF + entailment relation which corresponds to the underlying logic, we de ne indexed categories for the representing type theories, whose base categories are de ned using sorts, and whose bres are de ned using LF + judgements. Encodings then give rise to indexed functors, such that adequate encodings correspond to indexed isomorphisms. This result both con rms that our approach is a natural one, and provides a link between type-theoretic and categorical approaches to frameworks. The analogous result for natural representations follows in a similar fashion: see Gar92].
Logics and their representing type theories as indexed categories
In this section we provide the methodology for presenting logics and their representing type theories as (strict) indexed categories. For our purposes, we choose to concentrate on indexed categories rather than brations, since it is more natural to present a logic by considering rst the syntax, which provides the indexing, and then the consequence relation. First, we require some de nitions regarding indexed categories. A clear exposition of brations and indexed categories can be found, for example, in BW90].
4.1 Definition Let C be a category. A strict indexed category is a functor F : C op ! Cat where Cat is the category of small categories. The category C is the base category and, for c 2 obj (C), the bre over c is the category F(c).
All the indexed categories discussed in this section are strict, so whenever we refer to an indexed category we assume it is strict. is an indexed functor, whose base functor is an isomorphism, and whose natural transformation is a natural isomorphism.
Our presentation of logics as indexed categories is based on the categorical presentation of various particular logics, initiated by Lawvere Law70] but generalised to a wide class of logics. It concentrates on the abstract view of logics as consequence relations given in section 3.1. morphisms: nite tuples of term expressions (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) :x !ỹ = hy c1 This de nition is shown to be valid using the properties of simultaneous substitution and the consequence relation given in section 3.1.
We do not use the standard categorical approach for presenting type theories. Our presentation is motivated by the use of the type theory as a framework for representing logics, and utilises the fact that we are able to determine in a general way that part of the type theory which corresponds to the underlying logic. 
Adequate representations give indexed isomorphisms
We are now in a position to show the main result of this section, namely that the syntactic de nition of encodings gives rise to indexed functors, with the property that the encodings are adequate if and only if the functors are isomorphisms. Not all indexed functors give rise to encodings. For example, there is no guarantee that an indexed functor preserves the ordering or length of tuples. We believe that a more detailed analysis of the structure of these indexed categories (in particular, the categorical interpretation of sequences and contexts) will yield a two-way correspondence. This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. We are, however, able to deduce that the indexed functor determined by an encoding is an indexed isomorphism if and only if the encoding is adequate. This strong correspondence is feasible since we are dealing with a particular indexed functor given by the encoding, which preserves the ordering and length of tuples as the following lemma states. Proof (Sketch) By the de nition of (e base ; e) we know that the functor e base and, for allx 2 obj (A), the functors ex preserve the order and length of sequences and tuples. This yields parts 1a, 1b and 2a. Parts 1c and 2b follow from that fact that (f base ; f) is inverse to (e base ; e).
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We are now in a position to show the main result of this section, namely that adequate encodings correspond to indexed isomorphisms. 
The analogous result to theorem 4.8 for natural representations, see Gar92], follows in a similar fashion by adapting the indexed categories determined by the logic and its representing type theory to give an explicit account of the derivations of the logic and the terms inhabiting LF + judgements, and then showing that natural representations give rise to indexed isomorphisms.
Concluding Remarks
We have advocated the need for general de nitions to describe how well a logic has been represented in a logical framework. Based on ideas from HHP87], the new framework LF + is introduced in order to provide such de nitions. Two de nitions are given: adequate representation, which de nes when the consequence relation of a logic has been well-represented in the LF + entailment relation, and natural representation, which provides some measure that the derivations of the logic have been well-represented. Our arguments are reinforced by showing that these syntactic de nitions have a simple formulation as indexed isomorphisms.
Other de nitions of`correct' representation should be explored. For example, our approach for studying naturality is based on that found in HHP87]. An alternative approach is to investigate the representation of a consequence relation of sequents, which may contain schematic variables. Similar consequence relations have also been studied by Aczel Acz92] . One advantage of this consequence relation is that it captures the notion of the existence of derivations without adapting the logic. This approach should also lead to weaker notions of naturality. The investigation of this consequence relation and its representation in LF + is left for future research.
